Commentary for Bava Kamma 106:14
מאי טעמא דרבנן דאמר קרא (שמות כא, לג) ונפל שמה שור או חמור שור ולא אדם חמור ולא כלים ורבי יהודה או לרבות את הכלים ורבנן
[that there would be liability], excluding thus the case of this [ox] whose carcass could not be his.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As no use could lawfully be made of a carcass of a sacred animal that died. ');"><sup>22</sup></span> Does this mean that this last point was quite certain to Raba? Did not Raba put it as a query? For Raba asked; If a sacred ox which had become disqualified<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Through a blemish. ');"><sup>23</sup></span> [for the altar] fell into a pit, what would be the legal position? Shall we say that this [verse], And the beast shall be his, [confines liability to the case of] an ox whose carcass could be his, thus excluding the case of this ox whose carcass could never be his,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As no use could lawfully be made of a carcass of a sacred animal that died. ');"><sup>22</sup></span> or shall we say that the words And the dead beast shall be his are intended only to lay down that the owners [plaintiffs] have to retain the carcass as part payment?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra 10b. ');"><sup>24</sup></span> [The fact is that] after raising the question he himself solved it. But whence [then] would he derive the law that the owners [plaintiffs] have to retain the carcass as part payment? — He would derive it from the clause and the dead shall be his own<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 36. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> [inserted in the case] of Cattle. What reason have you for rising [the clause] And the dead shall be his own [in the context dealing] with Cattle to derive from it the law that the owners [plaintiffs] have to retain the carcass as part payment, while you rise [the clause] And the dead beast shall be his<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 310. n. 14. ');"><sup>26</sup></span> [in the context dealing] with Pit [to confine liability] to an animal whose carcass could be his?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 310. n. 15. ');"><sup>27</sup></span> Why should I not reverse [the implications of the clauses]? — It stands to reason that the exemption should be connected with Pit, since there is in Pit exemption also in the case of inanimate objects.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra p. 302, n. 2. ');"><sup>28</sup></span> On the contrary, should not the exemption be connected with Cattle, since in Cattle there is exemption from half damages [in the case of <i>Tam</i>]? — In any case, exemption from the whole payment is not found [in the case of cattle]. WHERE THERE FELL INTO IT AN OX TOGETHER WITH ITS IMPLEMENTS WHICH THEREBY BROKE etc. This Mishnaic ruling is not in accordance with R. Judah. For it was taught: R. Judah imposes liability for damage to inanimate objects done by Pit. But what was the reason of the Rabbis?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For maintaining exemption. ');"><sup>29</sup></span> — Because Scripture says, And an ox or an ass fall therein,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 33. ');"><sup>30</sup></span> [implying] 'ox' but not 'man',<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Dying through falling into a pit. ');"><sup>31</sup></span> 'ass' but not 'inanimate objects'. R. Judah, [however, maintained that the word] 'or' [was intended] to describe inanimate objects while the [other] Rabbis
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